

Rights

Political debate is littered with references to rights – the right to work, the right to education, the right to abortion, the right to life, the right to free speech, the right to own property and so forth. The idea is no less important in everyday language: children may claim the ‘right’ to stay up late or choose their own clothes; parents, for their part, may insist upon their ‘right’ to control what their children eat or watch on television. In its original meaning, the term ‘right’ stood for a power or privilege as in the right of the nobility, the right of the clergy, and, of course, the divine right of kings. However, in its modern sense, it refers to an entitlement to act or be treated in a particular way. Although it would be wrong to suggest that the doctrine of rights is universally accepted, most modern political thinkers have nevertheless been prepared to express their ideas in terms of rights or entitlements. The concept of rights is, in that sense, politically less contentious than, say, equality or social justice. However, there is far less agreement about the grounds upon which these rights are based, who should possess them, and which ones they should have.

There is, in the first place, a distinction between legal and moral rights. Some rights are laid down in law or in a system of formal rules and so are enforceable; others, however, exist only as moral or philosophical claims. Furthermore, particular problems surround the notion of human rights. Who, for instance, is to be regarded as ‘human’? Does this extend to children and embryos as well as to adults? Are particular groups of people, perhaps women and ethnic minorities, entitled to special rights by virtue either of their biological needs or social position? Finally, the conventional understanding of rights has been challenged by the emergence of the environmental and animal liberation movements, which have raised questions about the rights of non-humans, the rights of animals and other species. Are there rational grounds for refusing to extend rights to all species, or is this merely an irrational prejudice akin to sexism or racism?

Legal and moral rights

Legal rights are rights which are enshrined in law and are therefore enforceable through the courts. They have been described as ‘positive’ rights in that they are enjoyed or upheld regardless of their moral content, in keeping with the idea of ‘positive law’ discussed in the last chapter. Indeed, some legal rights remain in force for many years even though they are widely regarded as immoral. This can be said, for instance, about the legal right enjoyed by husbands in the UK until 1992 to rape their wives. Legal rights extend over a broad range of legal relationships. A classic attempt to categorize such rights was undertaken by Wesley Hohfeld in

Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923). Hohfeld identified four types of legal right. First, there are privileges or liberty-rights. These allow a person to do something in the simple sense that they have no obligation *not* to do it; they are 'at liberty' to do it – for instance, to use the public highway. Second, there are claim-rights, on the basis of which another person owes another a corresponding duty – for example, the right of one person not to be assaulted by another. Third, there are legal powers. These are best thought of as legal abilities, empowering someone to do something – for example, the right to get married or the right to vote. Fourth, there are immunities, according to which one person can avoid being subject to the power of another – for instance, the right of young, elderly and disabled people not to be drafted into the army.

The status which these legal rights enjoy within a political system varies considerably from country to country. In the UK, the content of legal rights has traditionally been vague and their status questionable. Before the Human Rights Act 1998, most individual rights, such as the right to free speech, freedom of movement and freedom of religious worship, were not embodied in statute law. Indeed, UK statute law consisted largely of prohibitions which constrained what the individual could do or say. For example, although there was no statutory right to free speech in the UK, there were a host of laws which restricted what UK citizens could say on grounds of slander, libel, defamation, blasphemy, incitement to riot, incitement to racial hatred, and so forth. Legal rights in the UK were often therefore described as 'residual', in that they were based upon the common law assumption that 'everything is permitted that is not prohibited'. The danger of this situation is that, lacking clear legal definition, it may be difficult or impossible to uphold individual rights in court. Although the Human Rights Act 1998 introduced greater clarity in the definition of rights, it did not give them entrenched status, allowing Parliament, albeit by a special procedure, to infringe the Act.

In contrast, a Bill of Rights operates in the USA and many other states. A Bill of Rights is a codified set of individual rights and liberties, enshrined in constitutional or 'higher' law. It is usually said to 'entrench' individual rights because such documents are complicated or difficult to amend. As such, a Bill of Rights can be seen to offer a number of clear advantages. In the first place, unlike traditional 'residual' rights in the UK, a Bill of Rights provides a clear legal definition of individual rights. Moreover, it can be said to have an educational value: by making people more aware of the rights they have it can promote within government, in the courts and among the general public what has been called a 'human rights culture'. Most significantly, however, a Bill of Rights establishes a mechanism through which rights can be legally defended and thus protects the individual from over-mighty government. This it achieves by investing in

the courts the power of 'judicial review', enabling them to check the power of other public bodies if they should infringe upon individual rights.

A Bill of Rights, nevertheless, may also bring disadvantages. UK conservatives, for instance, have traditionally argued that individual rights are best protected by common law because rights are then rooted in customs and traditions that lie at the very heart of the legal system. By comparison, a Bill of Rights may appear both inflexible and artificial. On the other hand, socialists have often objected to Bills of Rights on the grounds that they serve to protect class interests and so preserve social inequality. This can occur through the entrenchment of property rights, making nationalization impossible and blocking radical social reform. One of the most serious drawbacks of a Bill of Rights is, however, that it dramatically enlarges the authority of the judiciary. Given the typically vague or broad formulation of rights, judges end up deciding the proper scope of these, which, in effect, means that political decisions are taken by judges rather than by democratically elected politicians. Finally, it is clear that the mere existence of a Bill of Rights does not in itself guarantee that individual liberty will be respected. The Soviet Constitutions of 1936 and 1977, for example, established a truly impressive array of individual rights; but the subordination of the Soviet judiciary to the Communist Party ensured that few of these rights were upheld in practice. Similarly, despite the enactment in 1870 of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution granting the right to vote regardless of race, colour or previous condition of servitude, blacks in many Southern states were not able to vote until the 1960s.

A different range of rights, however, may have no legal substance but only exist as moral claims. The simplest example of this is a promise. A promise, freely and rationally made, invests one person with a moral obligation to fulfil its terms, and so grants the other party the right that it *should* be fulfilled. Unless the promise takes the form of a legally binding contract, it is enforced by moral considerations alone. It is, quite simply, the fact that it is freely made that creates the expectation that a promise will be, and should be, fulfilled. In most cases, however, moral rights are based, rather, upon their content. In other words, moral rights are more commonly 'ideal' rights, which bestow upon a person a benefit that they need or deserve. Moral rights therefore reflect what a person *should* have, from the perspective of a particular moral or religious system.

The danger with moral rights is, however, that they may become impossibly vague and degenerate into little more than an expression of what is morally desirable. This was precisely the view taken by Jeremy Bentham (see p. 359), the British utilitarian philosopher, who rejected the very idea of moral rights, believing them to be nothing more than a mistaken way of describing legal rights that *ought* to exist. Nevertheless, despite Bentham's scepticism, most systems of legal rights are under-

pinned, at least in theory, by some kind of moral considerations. For example, legal documents like the US Bill of Rights, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) have all developed out of attempts by philosophers to define the 'Rights of Man'. In order to investigate moral rights further it is necessary to examine the most influential form of moral rights – human rights.

Human rights

The idea of human rights developed out of the 'natural rights' theories of the early modern period. Such theories arose, primarily, out of the desire to establish some limits upon how individuals may be treated by others, especially by those who wield political power. However, if rights are to act as a check upon political authority, they must in a sense be 'pre-legal', law being merely the creation of political authority. In the seventeenth century, John Locke (see p. 268) identified as natural rights the right to 'life, liberty and property'; a century later, Thomas Jefferson defined them as the right to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness'. Such rights were described as 'natural' in that they were thought to be God-given and therefore to be part of the very core of human nature. Natural rights did not exist simply as moral claims but were, rather, considered to reflect the most fundamental inner human drives; they were the basic conditions for leading a truly human existence. As such, natural rights theories were psychological models every bit as much as they were ethical systems.

By the twentieth century, the decline of religious belief had led to the secularization of natural rights theories, which were reborn in the form of 'human' rights. Human rights are rights to which people are entitled by virtue of being human. They are therefore 'universal' rights in the sense that they belong to all human beings rather than to members of any particular nation, race, religion, gender, social class or whatever. Human rights are also 'fundamental' rights in that they are inalienable: they cannot be traded away or revoked. This was clearly expressed in the words of the American Declaration of Independence (1776), written by Jefferson, which proclaimed, 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights'. Many have further suggested that human rights are 'absolute' rights in that they must be upheld at all times and in all circumstances. However, this view is more difficult to sustain since in practice rights are often balanced against one another. For example, does the assertion of a right to life rule out capital punishment and all forms of warfare, whatever the provocation? The right to life cannot be absolute if a right to self-defence is also acknowledged.

Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826)

US political philosopher and statesman. A wealthy Virginian planter who was governor of Virginia, 1779–81, Jefferson served as the first US secretary of state, 1789–94. He was the third president of the USA, 1801–9. Jefferson was the principal author of the Declaration of Independence (1776), and wrote a vast number of addresses and letters.

Jefferson articulated a strong Enlightenment faith in the perfectibility of humankind and the capacity to solve political problems through the application of scientific method. He used the natural rights ideas of Locke (see p. 268) to develop a classic defence of national independence and government by consent. Jeffersonianism is usually viewed as a democratic form of agrarianism that sought to blend a belief in rule by a natural aristocracy with a commitment to limited government and *laissez-faire*, reflecting the belief that, 'That government is best which governs least.' He nevertheless demonstrated sympathy for social reform, favouring the extension of public education, the abolition of slavery, and greater economic equality. Although Jefferson is regarded as one of the founders of the Democratic coalition, he was fiercely critical of parties and factions, believing that they would promote conflict and destroy the underlying unity of society.

The concept of human rights raises a number of very different questions, about both who can be regarded as 'human' and the rights to which human beings are entitled. There is, for example, fierce controversy about the point at which 'human' life begins and so the point at which individuals acquire entitlements or rights. In particular, does human life begin at the moment of conception or does it begin at birth? Those who hold the former view uphold what they see as the rights of the unborn and reject absolutely practices like abortion and embryo research. On the other hand, however, if human life is thought to start at birth, abortion is quite acceptable since it reflects a woman's right to control her own body. Such contrasting positions do not only reflect different conceptions of life but also allocate rights to human beings on very different grounds. Those who regard embryos as 'human' in the same sense as adults, draw upon the belief that life is sacred. According to this view, all living things are entitled to rights, regardless of the form or quality of life with which they may be blessed. However, if life itself is regarded as the basis for rights it becomes difficult to see why rights should be restricted to humans and not extended to animals and other forms of life. To argue, by contrast, that 'human' life begins only at birth is to establish a narrower basis for allocating rights, such as the ability to live independently, to enjoy a measure of self-

consciousness, or the ability to make rational or moral choices. If such criteria are employed, however, it is difficult to see how human rights can be granted to groups of people who do not themselves fulfil such requirements, for example, children and people with mental or physical disabilities.

A further problem arises from the fact that while human rights are universal, human beings are not identical. This can clearly be seen in the notion that women in some sense enjoy rights that are different from men's. To advance the cause of 'women's rights' may simply be to argue that human rights, initially developed with men in mind, should also be extended to women. This would apply in the case of women's right to education, their right to enter particular professions, their right to equal pay and so forth. However, the idea of women's rights may also be based upon the fact that women have specific needs and capacities which entitle them to rights which in relation to men would be unnecessary or simply meaningless. Such rights would include those related to childbirth or childcare, such as the right to perinatal maternity leave. More controversial, however, is the notion that women are entitled to a set of rights in addition to men's in an attempt to compensate them for their unequal treatment by society. For example, social conventions that link child-bearing and child-rearing and so channel women into a domestic realm of motherhood and housework undermine their capacity to gain an education and pursue a career. In such circumstances, women's rights could extend to a form of reverse discrimination which seeks to rectify past injustices by, say, establishing quotas for the number of women in higher education and in certain professions. In so far as such rights are based upon a commitment to equal treatment it can be argued that they draw upon the notion of human rights. However, it is difficult to regard women's rights in this sense as fundamental human rights since they are not allocated to all human beings. Rights that arise out of unequal or unjust treatment will be meaningful only so long as the inequality or injustice that justifies their existence persists.

Even when such controversies are set aside, there are very deep divisions about what rights human beings should enjoy. The idea that rights-based theories in some way stand above ideological and political differences is clearly misguided. From the outset, the idea of natural rights was closely linked to the liberal notion of limited government. The traditional formulation that human beings are entitled to the right to life, liberty and property, or the pursuit of happiness, regarded rights as a private sphere within which the individual could enjoy independence from the encroachments of other individuals and, more particularly, from the interference of the state. These rights are therefore 'negative' rights or 'forbearance' rights; they can be enjoyed only if constraints are placed

upon others. For instance, the right to property requires that limits be set to the government's ability to tax, an idea clearly reflected in the principle of 'no taxation without representation'.

During the twentieth century, however, another range of rights came to be added to these traditional liberal ones, an acknowledgement of government's growing responsibility for economic and social life. These are welfare rights, social and economic rights, and they are 'positive' in the sense that they demand not forbearance but active government intervention. The right to health care, for example, requires some form of health insurance, if not a publicly funded system of health provision. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes not only classical 'negative' rights, like the right to 'freedom of thought, conscience and religion' (Article 18), but also 'positive' rights such as the 'right to work' (Article 23) and the 'right to education' (Article 26). Such welfare rights have, however, provoked fierce disagreement between socialists and conservatives, leading to the development of two contrasting models of citizenship. This controversy is examined in the final section of the chapter in relation to social citizenship and active citizenships.

Finally, the very idea of natural or human rights has been attacked, notably by utilitarians (see p. 358), Marxists (see p. 82) and multicultural theorists (see p. 215). As pointed out earlier, Jeremy Bentham was prepared to acknowledge only the existence of 'positive' or legal rights. Natural rights were subjective or metaphysical entities, which Bentham dismissed as 'nonsense on stilts'. Marx (see p. 373), on the other hand, regarded the doctrine of 'the Rights of Man' as little more than a means of advancing the interests of private property. In his view, every right was a 'right of inequality' since it applied an equal standard to unequal individuals. For instance, the right to property can be regarded as a 'bourgeois' right because it has very different implications for the rich and the poor. Multicultural theorists have questioned the relevance and value of human rights in modern pluralistic societies. In particular, they have drawn attention to the extent to which the idea of human rights reflects a form of ethnocentrism, in which the norms and values of dominant cultural groups take precedence over those of minority cultural groups. Anticolonial and postcolonial theories (see p. 102) have at times portrayed the doctrine of human rights as an example of cultural imperialism.

Animal and other rights?

The final decades of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of the animal welfare and animal liberation movements as part of the broader growth of ecologism. These have campaigned, for instance, in favour of

vegetarianism and improved treatment of farm animals, and against the fur trade and animal experiments. Such campaigns have typically been carried out under the banner of 'animal rights'. This amounts to the assertion that animals have rights in the same sense that human beings do; indeed, it implies that once human beings are invested with rights it is impossible not to extend these same rights to animals. In effect, the doctrine of human rights leads irresistibly in the direction of animal rights. However, on what basis can animals be said to have rights, and is the notion of animal rights at all meaningful or coherent?

Animal rights theories have developed in popularity since the 1960s as a result of the growth of ecological theories that have tried to redefine the relationship between humans and the natural world. Traditional attitudes towards animals and nature in general in the West were shaped by the Christian belief that human beings enjoyed a God-given dominion over the world, reflected in their stewardship over all other species. In medieval Europe, it was not uncommon for animals to be tried before ecclesiastical courts for alleged wrong-doing, on the grounds that as God's creatures they, like humans, were subject to 'natural law'. At the same time, however, Christianity taught that humankind was the centrepiece of creation and that animals had been placed on the earth for the sole purpose of providing for human needs. Since they do not possess immortal souls, animals can in no sense be regarded as equal to humans. Environmentalist theories, by contrast, hold that human beings are neither above nor beyond the natural world but are, rather, an inseparable part of it. This belief is much closer to the pagan notion of an Earth Mother and to the emphasis found in Eastern religions like Hinduism and Buddhism upon the oneness of all forms of life. In the process, the clear distinction once thought to exist between humans and animals has come under increasing pressure.

It is important, however, to distinguish between the notion of 'animal welfare' and the more radical idea of 'animal rights'. Animal welfare reflects an altruistic concern for the well-being of other species, but not one which necessarily places them on the same level as humans. Such an argument was, for example, advanced by the Peter Singer (see p. 359) in *Animal Liberation* (1975). Singer argued that concern for the welfare of animals is based upon the fact that as sentient beings they are capable of suffering. Like humans, animals clearly have an interest in avoiding physical pain. For Singer, the interests of animals and humans in this respect are equal, and he condemns any attempt to place the interests of humans above those of animals as 'speciesism', an arbitrary and irrational prejudice not unlike sexism or racism. The animal welfare argument emphasizes the need to treat animals with respect and to try, whenever possible, to minimize their suffering. It may, nevertheless, acknowledge

Ecologism

The term ecology was coined by the German zoologist Ernst Haeckel in 1866 to refer to 'the investigations of the total relations of the animal both to its organic and its inorganic environment'. Ecological or green political ideas can be traced back to the nineteenth-century backlash against the spread of industrialization and urbanization. Modern ecologism emerged during the 1960s along with renewed concern about the damage done to the environment by pollution, resource depletion, over-population and so on. Such concerns have been articulated politically by a growing number of Green parties which now operate in most developed societies and, at least in the case of the German Greens, have shared government power, and through the influence of a powerful environmentalist lobby whose philosophy is, 'Think globally, act locally'.

The central feature of ecologism is that it regards nature as an interconnected whole, embracing humans and non-humans as well as the inanimate world. This view is expressed in the adoption of an ecocentric or biocentric perspective that accords priority to nature or the planet and thus differs from the anthropocentric or human-centred perspective of conventional political thought. Nevertheless, two strains of ecologism are normally identified. 'Deep ecology' completely rejects any lingering belief that the human species is in some way superior to, or more important than, any other species – or, indeed, nature itself. 'Shallow ecology', by contrast, accepts the lessons of ecology but harnesses them to human needs and ends. In other words, it preaches that if we can serve and cherish the natural world, it will, in turn, continue to sustain human life.

Shallow or humanist ecologism is compatible with a number of other creeds, creating hybrid political traditions. Ecosocialism, usually influenced by modern Marxism (see p. 82), explains environmental destruction in terms of capitalism's rapacious quest for profit; eco-anarchism draws parallels between natural equilibrium in nature and in human communities, using the idea of social ecology; and ecofeminism has portrayed patriarchy as the source of the ecological crisis. On the other hand, deep ecology goes beyond the perspective of conventional political creeds. It tends to regard both capitalism and socialism as examples of the 'super-ideology' of industrialism, characterised by large-scale production, the accumulation of capital and relentless growth. It supports biocentric equality, holding that the rights of animals have the same moral status as those of humans, and portraying nature as an ethical community within which human beings are merely 'plain citizens'.

However, the spread of ecological thought has been hampered by a number of factors. These include the limited attraction of its anti-growth, or at least sustainable growth, economic model, and that its critique of industrial society is sometimes advanced from a pastoral and anti-technology perspective that is quite out of step with the modern world. Some, as a result, dismiss ecologism as simply an urban fad, a form of post-industrial romanticism. Ecologism, nevertheless, has at least two major strengths. First, it draws attention to an





imbalance in the relationship between humans and the natural world that is manifest in a growing catalogue of threats to the well-being of both. Second, ecologism has gone further than any other tradition in questioning and transcending the limited focus of Western political thought. In keeping with globalization, it is the nearest thing political theory has to a world philosophy and it has allowed political thought to be fertilized by the insights of pagan religions and native cultures, and Eastern religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Taoism.

Key figures

Ernst Friedrich Schumacher (1911–77) A German-born British economist and environmental theorist, ‘Fritz’ Schumacher championed the cause of human-scale production and helped to develop an ecological philosophy. His notion of ‘Buddhist’ economics (‘economics as if people mattered’) stressed the importance of morality and ‘right livelihood’, and warned against the depletion of finite energy sources. Though an opponent of industrial giantism, Schumacher believed in ‘appropriate’ scale production, and was a keen advocate of ‘intermediate’ technology. His seminal work is *Small is Beautiful* (1973).

James Lovelock (1919–) A Canadian atmospheric chemist, inventor and environmental theorist, Lovelock is best known for having developed the Gaia hypothesis. This portrays the Earth’s biosphere as a complex, self-regulating, living ‘being’, called Gaia after the Greek goddess of the Earth. Although the Gaia hypothesis extends the ecological idea by applying it to the planet as an ecosystem and offers a holistic approach to nature, Lovelock supports technology and industrialization and is an opponent of ‘back to nature’ mysticism and ideas such as Earth worship. His major writings include *Gaia* (1979) and *The Ages of Gaia* (1989).

Murray Bookchin (1921–) A US anarchist social philosopher and environmentalist, Bookchin is the leading proponent of ‘social ecology’. As an anarchist he has emphasized the potential for non-hierarchic cooperation within conditions of post-scarcity and promoted decentralization and community within modern societies. His principle of social ecology propounds the view that ecological principles can be applied to social organization and argues that the environmental crisis is a result of the breakdown of the organic fabric of both society and nature. Bookchin’s major works include *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (1971), *The Ecology of Freedom* (1982) and *Remaking Society* (1989).

Rudolph Bahro (1936–98) A German writer and Green activist, Bahro attempted to reconcile socialism with ecological theories. His argument that capitalism is the root cause of environmental problems led him to assert that those concerned with human survival should convert to socialism, and that





people who support social justice must take account of ecological sustainability. Bahro subsequently moved beyond conventional ecosocialism, concluding that the ecological crisis is so pressing that it must take precedence over the class struggle. Bahro's chief works include *Socialism and Survival* (1982), *From Red to Green* (1984) and *Building the Green Movement* (1986).

Carolyn Merchant (1936–) A US academic and feminist, Merchant's work has highlighted links between gender oppression and the 'death of nature'. She developed a socialist feminist critique of the scientific revolution that ultimately explains environmental destruction in terms the application by men of a mechanistic view of nature. According to this view, a global ecological revolution would reconstruct gender relations as well as the relationship between humans and nature. Her ideas have had a considerable impact on environmental history and philosophy as well as on ecofeminism. Merchant's chief works include *The Death of Nature* (1980) and *Radical Ecology* (1991).

Further reading

Dobson, A. *Green Political Thought*. London: HarperCollins, 1990.

Eckersley, R. *Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach*. London: UCL Press, 2000.

Hayward, T. *Ecological Thought: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.

that it is natural or inevitable for humans, like all species, to prefer their own kind and to place human interests before those of other species. The animal welfare movement may therefore oppose factory farming because it is cruel to animals, but not go as far as to insist upon vegetarianism. Altruistic concern does not imply equal treatment. The animal rights argument, on the other hand, has more radical implications precisely because it is derived directly from human rights theories.

Animal rights theories commence by examining the grounds upon which rights are allocated to humans. One possibility is that rights spring out of the existence of life itself: human beings have rights because they are living individuals. If this is true, however, it naturally follows that the same rights should be granted to other living creatures. For instance, the US philosopher Tom Regan argued in *The Case for Animal Rights* (1983) that all creatures that are 'the subject of a life' qualify for rights. He therefore suggested that as the right to life is the most fundamental of all rights, the killing of an animal, however painless, is as morally indefensible as the killing of a human being. Regan acknowledges, however, that in some cases rights are invested in human beings on very different grounds, notably that they, unlike animals, are capable of rational thought and

moral autonomy. The right to free speech, freedom of worship and to gain an education may seem absurd if invested in animals. Regan nevertheless points out that such an argument fails to draw a clear distinction between the animal and human worlds. There are, for instance, what Regan calls 'marginal cases', human beings who because of mental disability have very little capacity to exercise reason or enjoy autonomy. If rights are invested on the grounds of rational and moral capacity rather than life itself, surely such humans can be treated as animals traditionally have been: they can be used for food, clothing, scientific experimentation and so forth. At the same time, there are clearly animals that possess mental capacities more normally associated with humans; for instance, research has shown dolphin communication systems to be every bit as sophisticated as human language. Logically pursued, therefore, this argument may justify the allocation to some animals of rights which are nevertheless denied to 'marginal' humans.

It is difficult, however, to see how these ideas can be confined to animals alone. If the distinction between humans and animals is called into question, how adequate are distinctions between mammals and fish, or between animals and plants? Evidence from biologists such as Lyall Watson (1973) suggests that, in contrast to conventional assumptions, plant life may possess the capacity to experience physical pain. What is clear is that if rights belong to humans and animals it is absurd to deny them to fish on the grounds that they live in water, or to deny them to plants simply because they do not run around on two legs or four. Although such ideas seem bizarre from the conventional Western standpoint, they merely restate a belief in the interconnectedness of all forms of life long expressed by Eastern religions and acknowledged by pre-Christian 'pagan' creeds. On the other hand, it is reasonable to remember that the material and social progress that the human species has made has been achieved, in part, because of a willingness to treat other species, and indeed the natural world, as a resource available for human use. To alter this relationship by acknowledging the rights of other species has profound implications not only for moral conduct but also for the material and social organisation of human life.

Obligations

An obligation is a requirement or duty to act in a particular way. H.L.A. Hart (1961) distinguished between 'being obliged' to do something, which implies an element of coercion, and 'having an obligation' to do something, which suggests only a moral duty. Though a cashier in a bank

may feel obliged to hand over money to a gunman, he is under no obligation, in the second sense, to do so. This can be seen in the distinction between legal and moral obligations. Legal obligations, such as the requirement to pay taxes and observe other laws, are enforceable through the courts and backed up by a system of penalties. Such obligations may be upheld on grounds of simple prudence: whether laws are right or wrong they are obeyed out of a fear of punishment. Moral obligations, with which this chapter is concerned, are fulfilled not because it is sensible to do so but because such conduct is thought to be rightful or morally correct. To give a promise, for example, is to be under a moral obligation to carry it out, regardless of the consequences which breaking the promise would entail.

In a sense, rights and obligations are the reverse sides of the same coin. To possess a right usually places someone else under an obligation to uphold or respect that right. In that sense, the individual rights discussed in the previous section place heavy obligations upon the state. If the right to life is meaningful, for instance, then government is subject to an obligation to maintain public order and ensure personal security. 'Negative' rights entail an obligation on the part of the state to limit or constrain its power; 'positive' rights oblige the state to manage economic life, provide a range of welfare services and so on. However, if citizens are bearers of rights alone and all obligations fall upon the state, orderly and civilized life would be impossible: individuals who possess rights but acknowledge no obligations would be lawless and unrestrained. Citizenship, therefore, entails a blend of rights and obligations, the most basic of which has traditionally been described as 'political obligation', the duty of the citizen to acknowledge the authority of the state and obey its laws.

The only political thinkers who are prepared to reject political obligation out of hand are philosophical anarchists such as Robert Paul Wolff (1970), who insist upon absolute respect for individual autonomy. Others, however, have been more interested in debating not whether political obligation exists, but the grounds upon which it can be advanced. The classic explanation of political obligation is found in the idea of a 'social contract', the belief that there are clear rational and moral grounds for respecting state authority. Other thinkers, however, have gone further and suggested that obligations, responsibilities and duties are not merely contractual but are instead an intrinsic feature of any stable society. Nevertheless, few theorists have been prepared to regard political obligation as absolute. What they disagree about, however, is where the limits of political obligation can be drawn. At what point can the dutiful citizen be released from his or her obligation to obey the state and exercise, by contrast, a right of rebellion?

Contractual obligations

Social contract theory is as ancient as political philosophy itself. Some form of social contract can be found in the writings of Plato (see p. 21); it was the cornerstone of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers like Hobbes (see p. 123), Locke and Rousseau (see p. 242); and it has resurfaced in modern times in the writings of theorists such as John Rawls (see p. 298). A 'contract' is a formal agreement between two or more parties. Contracts, however, are a specific kind of agreement, entered into voluntarily and on mutually agreed terms. To enter into a contract is, in effect, to make a promise to abide by its terms; it therefore entails a moral as well as sometimes a legal obligation. A 'social contract' is an agreement made either among citizens, or between citizens and the state, through which they accept the authority of the state in return for benefits which only a sovereign power can provide. However, the basis of this contract and the obligations it entails have been the source of profound disagreement.

The earliest form of social contract theory was outlined starkly in Plato's *Crito*. After his trial for corrupting the youth of Athens, and facing certain death, Socrates explains his refusal to escape from prison to his old friend Crito. Socrates points out that by choosing to live in Athens and by enjoying the privileges of being an Athenian citizen, he had, in effect, promised to obey Athenian law, and he intended to keep his promise even at the cost of his own life. From this point of view, political obligation arises out of the benefits derived from living within an organized community. The obligation to obey the state is based upon an implicit promise made by the simple fact that citizens choose to remain within its borders. This argument, however, runs into difficulties. In the first place, it is not easy to demonstrate that natural-born citizens have made a promise or entered into an agreement, even an implicit one. The only citizens who have made a clear promise and entered into a 'contract of citizenship' are naturalised citizens, who may even have signed a formal oath to that effect. Moreover, citizens living within a state may claim either that they receive no benefit from it and are therefore under no obligation, or that the state's influence upon their lives is entirely brutal and repressive. Socrates' notion of political obligation is unconditional in that it does not take into account how the state is formed or how it behaves. Finally, Socrates appears to have assumed that citizens dissatisfied with one state would easily be able to take up residence in another. In practice, this may be difficult or impossible: emigration can be restricted by the exercise of force, as was the case with the Soviet Jews, by economic circumstances, and, of course, by immigration regulations imposed by other states.

The social contract theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3, advance, by contrast, a more

conditional basis for political obligation. Thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke were concerned to explain how political authority arose amongst human beings who are morally free and equal. In their view, the right to rule had to be based upon the consent of the governed. This they explained by analysing the nature of a hypothetical society without government, a so-called 'state of nature'. Their portrait of the state of nature was distinctly unattractive: a barbaric civil war of all against all, brought about by the unrestrained pursuit of power and wealth. They therefore suggested that rational individuals would be prepared to enter into an agreement, a social contract, through which a common authority could be established and order guaranteed. This contract was clearly the basis of political obligation, implying as it did a duty to respect law and the state. In very few cases, however, did contractarian theorists believe that the social contract was a historical fact, whose terms could subsequently be scrutinized and examined. Rather, it was employed as a philosophical device through which theorists could discuss the grounds upon which citizens should obey their state. The conclusions they arrived at, however, vary significantly.

In *Leviathan* ([1651] 1968), Thomas Hobbes argued that citizens have an absolute obligation to obey political authority, regardless of how government may behave. In effect, Hobbes believed that though citizens were obliged to obey their state, the state itself was not subject to any reciprocal obligations. This was because Hobbes believed that the existence of any state, however oppressive, is preferable to the existence of no state at all, which would lead to a descent into chaos and barbarism. Clearly, Hobbes's views reflect a heightened concern about the dangers of instability and disorder, perhaps resulting from the fear and insecurity he himself experienced during the English Civil War. However, it is difficult to accept his belief that any form of protest, any limit upon political obligation, would occasion the collapse of all authority and the re-establishment of the state of nature. For Hobbes, citizens are confronted by a stark choice between absolutism and anarchy.

An alternative and more balanced view of political obligation is found in the writings of John Locke. Locke's ([1690] 1965) account of the origins of political obligation involve the establishment of two contracts. The first, the social contract proper, was undertaken by all the individuals who form a society. In effect, they volunteered to sacrifice a portion of their liberty in order to secure the order and stability which only a political community can offer. The second contract, or 'trust', was undertaken between a society and its government, through which the latter was authorised to protect the natural rights of its citizens. This implied that obedience to government was conditional upon the state fulfilling its side of the contract. If the state became a tyranny against the individual, the

individual could exercise the right of rebellion, which is precisely what Locke believed had occurred in the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688, which overthrew the Stuart dynasty. However, in Locke's account, rebellion consists of the removal by a society of its government rather than the dissolution of the social contract and a return to the state of nature.

A very different form of social contract theory was developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in *The Social Contract* ([1762] 1969). Whereas Hobbes and Locke had assumed human beings to be power-seeking and narrowly self-interested, Rousseau held a far more optimistic view of human nature. He was attracted by the notion of the 'noble savage' and believed that the roots of injustice lay not in the human individual but rather in society itself. In Rousseau's view, government should be based upon what he called the 'general will', reflecting the common interests of society as opposed to the 'private will', or selfish wishes of each member. In a sense, Rousseau espoused an orthodox social contract theory in that he said that an individual is bound by the rules of a society, including its general will, only if he himself has consented to be a member of that society. At the same time, however, the general will alone can also be seen as a ground for political obligation. By articulating the general will the state is, in effect, acting in the 'real' interests of each of its members. In this way, political obligation can be interpreted as a means of obeying one's own higher or 'true' self. Such a theory of obligation, however, moves away from the idea of government by consent. Being blinded by ignorance and selfishness, citizens may not recognize that the general will embodies their 'real' interests. In such circumstances, Rousseau acknowledged that citizens should be 'forced to be free'; in other words they should be forced to obey their own 'true' selves.

Natural duty

Social contract theories of whatever kind share the common belief that there are rational or moral grounds for obeying state authority. They therefore hold that political obligation is based upon individual choice and decision, upon a specific act of voluntary commitment. Such voluntaristic theories are, however, by no means universally accepted. Some point out, for instance, that many of the obligations to which the individual is subject do not, and often cannot, arise out of contractual agreements. Not only does this apply in most cases to political obligation, but it is even more clear in relation to social duties, like those of children towards parents, which arise long before the children have any meaningful ability to enter into a contract. In addition, social contract theories are based upon individualistic assumptions, implying that society is a human creation or

artefact, fashioned by the rational undertakings of independent individuals. This may fundamentally misconceive the nature of society and fail to recognize the degree to which society helps to shape its members and invest them with duties and responsibilities.

There are two principal alternatives to contract theory as a ground of political obligation. The first of these encompasses theories that are usually described as teleological, from the Greek *telos*, meaning a purpose or goal. Such theories suggest that the duty of citizens to respect the state and obey its commands is based upon the benefits or goods which the state provides. This can be seen in any suggestion that political obligation arises from the fact that the state acts in the common good or public interest, perhaps presented in terms of Rousseau's general will. The most influential teleological theory has been utilitarianism (see p. 366), which implies, in simple terms, that citizens should obey government because it strives to achieve 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number'.

The second set of theories, however, relate to the idea that membership of a particular society is somehow 'natural', in which case political obligation can be thought of as a natural duty. To conceive of political obligation in this way is to move away from the idea of voluntary behaviour. A duty is a task or action that a person is *bound* to perform for moral reasons; it is not just a morally preferable action. Thus the debt of gratitude which Socrates claimed he owed Athens did not allow him to challenge or resist its laws, even at the cost of his own life. The idea of natural duty has been particularly attractive to conservative thinkers (see p. 138), who have stressed the degree to which all social groups, including political communities, are held together by the recognition of mutual obligations and responsibilities.

Conservatives have traditionally shied away from doctrines like 'the Rights of Man', not only because they are thought to be abstract and worthless but also because they treat the individual as pre-social, implying that human beings can be conceived of outside or beyond society. By contrast, conservatives have preferred to understand society as organic, and to recognize that it is shaped by internal forces beyond the capacity of any individual to control. Human institutions such as the family, the church and government have not therefore been constructed in accordance with individual wishes or needs but by the forces of natural necessity which help to sustain society itself. Individuals are therefore supported, educated, nurtured and moulded by society, and as a result inherit a broad range of responsibilities, obligations and duties. These include not merely the obligation to obey the law and respect the liberties of others, but also wider social duties such as to uphold established authority and, if appropriate, to shoulder the burden of public office. In this way, conservatives argue that the obligation of citizens towards their

government has the same character as the duty and respect that children owe their parents.

The cause of social duty has also been taken up by socialist and social-democratic (see p. 308) theorists. Socialists have traditionally underlined the need for community and cooperation, emphasizing that human beings are essentially sociable and gregarious creatures. Social duty can therefore be understood as the practical expression of community; it reflects the responsibility of every human being towards every other member of society. This may, for instance, incline socialists to place heavier responsibilities upon the citizen than liberals would be prepared to do. These could include the obligation to work for the community, perhaps through some kind of public service, and the duty to provide welfare support for those who are not able to look after themselves. A society in which individuals possess only rights but recognize no duties or obligations would be one in which the strong may prosper but the weak would go to the wall. Such a line of argument can even be discerned among communitarian anarchists. Although classical anarchists such as Proudhon (see p. 367), Bakunin (1814–76) and Kropotkin (see p. 26) rejected the claims of political authority, they nevertheless recognized that a healthy society demanded sociable, cooperative and respectful behaviour from its members. This amounts to a theory of ‘social’ obligation that in some ways parallels the more traditional notion of political obligation.

Limits of political obligation

Political obligation denotes not a duty to obey a particular law but rather the citizen’s duty to respect and obey the state itself. When the limits of political obligation are reached, the citizen is not merely released from a duty to obey the state but, in effect, gains an entitlement: the right to rebel. A rebellion is an attempt to overthrow state power, usually involving a substantial body of citizens as well as, in most cases, the use of violence. Although any major uprising against government can be described as a rebellion, the term is often used in contrast to revolution to describe the attempt to overthrow a government rather than replace an entire political regime. Rebellion can be justified in different ways. In some cases, the act of rebellion reflects a belief that government does not, and never has, exercised legitimate authority. This can be seen, for example, in the case of colonial rule, where government amounts to little more than domination: it is imposed by force and maintained by systematic coercion. The rebellion in India against British rule, and indeed the national liberation struggles that have taken place throughout Asia and Africa, did not seek justification in terms of political obligation. Quite simply, no duty to obey the colonial ruler had ever been acknowledged, so no limit to obligation

had been reached. In the case of the American Revolution of 1776, however, the rebellion of the 13 former British colonies was justified explicitly in terms of a right of rebellion rooted in a theory of political obligation.

The American revolutionaries drew heavily upon the ideas John Locke had developed in *Two Treatises on Civil Government* ([1690] 1965). Locke had emphasized that political obligation was conditional upon respect for natural rights. On these grounds he gave support to the English 'Glorious Revolution' which overthrew Stuart rule and established a constitutional monarchy under William and Mary. The American Declaration of Independence was imbued with classic social contract principles. In the first place, it portrays government as a human artefact, created by men to serve their purposes; the powers of government are therefore derived from the 'consent of the governed'. However, the contract upon which government is based is very specific: human beings are endowed with certain 'inalienable rights' including the right to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness', and it is the purpose of government to secure and protect these rights. Clearly, therefore, political obligation is not absolute; citizens have an obligation to obey government only so long as it respects these fundamental rights. When government becomes an 'absolute despotism', the Declaration of Independence states that 'it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government'. In other words, the limits of political obligation have been reached and citizens have a right, indeed a duty, to rebel against such a government and to 'provide new guards for their future security'.

Such Lockian principles are rooted very deeply in liberal ideas and assumptions. Social contract theories imply that since the state is created by an agreement among rational individuals it must serve the interests of all citizens and so be neutral or impartial. By the same token, if the state fails in its fundamental task of protecting individual rights it fails all its citizens and not just certain groups or sections. Conservatives, by contrast, have been far less willing to acknowledge that political obligation is conditional. Authoritarian conservatives, following Hobbes, warn that any challenge to established authority risks the complete collapse of orderly existence. This is what led Joseph de Maistre (see p. 165), a fierce critic of the French Revolution, to suggest that politics is based upon a willing and complete subordination to 'the master'. According to this view, the very notion of a limit to political obligation is dangerous and insidious. Although modern conservatives embrace constitutionalism and democracy, they often fear protest, rebellion and revolt, and are not unmindful of the benefits which strong government brings.

Marxists and anarchists, however, have a very different attitude towards political obligation. Classical Marxists discount any idea of a social

contract and believe instead that the state is an instrument of class oppression; it is a 'bourgeois state'. The function of the state is therefore not to protect individual rights so much as to defend or advance the interests of the 'ruling class'. Indeed, Marxists have traditionally regarded social contract theories as 'ideological' in the sense that they serve class interests by concealing the contradictions upon which capitalism and all class societies are based. In this light, the notion of political obligation is a myth or delusion whose only purpose is to reconcile the proletariat to its continued exploitation. Although anarchists may be prepared to accept the notion of 'social' obligation, the idea of 'political' obligation is, in their view, entirely unfounded. If the state is an oppressive, exploitative and coercive body, the idea that individuals may have a moral obligation to accept its authority is quite absurd. Political obligation, in other words, amounts to nothing more than servitude.

Citizenship

As already noted, the concept of citizenship is rooted in the political thought of Ancient Greece. Citizenship has also been one of the central themes of the republican political tradition. In its simplest form, a 'citizen' is a member of a political community who is endowed with a set of rights and a set of obligations. Citizenship therefore represents a relationship between the individual and the state, in which the two are bound together by reciprocal rights and obligations. However, the precise nature of this relationship is the subject of considerable argument and dispute. For example, some view citizenship as a legal status which can be defined objectively, while others see it as an identity, a sense of loyalty or belonging. The most contentious question, however, relates to the precise nature of citizen's rights and obligations, and the balance between the two. Although citizenship often appears to be 'above politics' in the sense that most, if not all, theorists are prepared to endorse it, in practice there are competing concepts of citizenship. The most important of these have been social citizenship and active citizenship. Finally, the emergence of modern multicultural societies has led some to question whether the doctrine of universal citizenship any longer helps to emancipate disadvantaged groups.

Elements of citizenship

To define the citizen simply as 'a member of a political community' is hopelessly vague. One attempt to refine the notion of citizenship is to define its legal substance, by reference to the specific rights and obligations which a state invests in its members. 'Citizens' can therefore be